Is Intuition Central in Philosophy?

This paper defends Centrality in response to two recent objections: the "argument from non-neutrality" and the "argument from reasoning." According to the argument from non-neutrality, we should not believe the truth of Centrality because it is ill-motivated by a particular diale...

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Bibliographic Details
Published inThe Philosophical forum Vol. 47; no. 3-4; pp. 281 - 296
Main Author Wang, Tinghao
Format Journal Article
LanguageEnglish
Published Oxford Blackwell Publishing Ltd 01.09.2016
Subjects
Cognition & reasoning
Philosophy
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Summary:This paper defends Centrality in response to two recent objections: the "argument from non-neutrality" and the "argument from reasoning." According to the argument from non-neutrality, we should not believe the truth of Centrality because it is ill-motivated by a particular dialectical standard of evidence. According to the argument from reasoning, philosophical practice relies on argumentation rather than intuition as its central evidence. As will be seen, both objections have different implications for different versions of Centrality.
Bibliography:istex:EC4C03A9AE525B9C15A2D2812A38BC21ED149A6A
ark:/67375/WNG-WTKW129T-6
ArticleID:PHIL12123
Thanks to Jennifer Nado, Max Deutsch, Darrell Rowbottom, and Chris Atkinson for helpful comments on an earlier draft.
ISSN:0031-806X
1467-9191
DOI:10.1111/phil.12123