What makes coups outside the chain of command in Turkey succeed or fail?

Existing work on civil-military relations in Turkey has left the question of coup outcomes understudied. Although coups organized in line with the military chain of command are automatically assumed most likely to succeed, not all coup attempts carried out by junior/mid-ranking officers are doomed t...

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Bibliographic Details
Published inMediterranean politics (Frank Cass & Co.) Vol. 25; no. 4; pp. 433 - 455
Main Author Aslan, Ömer
Format Journal Article
LanguageEnglish
Published Abingdon Routledge 07.08.2020
Taylor & Francis Ltd
Subjects
15 July 2016
27 May 1960
Armed forces
Civil-military relations
Commands
Coordination
Coordination games
Coups d'etat
Game theory
Gulenists
Ratings & rankings
Talat Aydemir
Turkish armed forces
Turkey
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Summary:Existing work on civil-military relations in Turkey has left the question of coup outcomes understudied. Although coups organized in line with the military chain of command are automatically assumed most likely to succeed, not all coup attempts carried out by junior/mid-ranking officers are doomed to fail. While 27 May 1960 coup by junior officers succeeded, three other coups attempted outside the chain of command in 1962, 1963, and 15 July 2016 in Turkey failed. Why? This article uses 'coordination game' framework as a theoretical tool to provide an answer. These cases lend significant support to application of game theoretic models to the literature on military coup outcomes.
ISSN:1362-9395
1743-9418
DOI:10.1080/13629395.2018.1554093