Are the folk historicists about moral responsibility?

• Published in: Philosophical psychology Vol. 33; no. 1; pp. 1 - 22
• Main Authors: Taylor, Matthew, M. Maranges, Heather
• Format: Journal Article
• Language: English
• Published: Abingdon Routledge 02.01.2020; Taylor & Francis Ltd
• Subjects: compatibilism; experimental philosophy; Free will; moral responsibility
• ISSN: 0951-5089; 1465-394X
• DOI: 10.1080/09515089.2019.1695045

Manipulation cases have figured prominently in philosophical debates about whether moral responsibility is in some sense deeply historical. Meanwhile, some philosophers have thought that folk thinking about manipulated agents may shed some light on the various argumentative burdens facing participants in that debate. This paper argues that folk thinking is, to some extent, historical. Across three experiments, a substantial number of participants did not attribute moral responsibility to agents with manipulation in their histories. The results of these experiments challenge previous research indicating that folk thinking is not historicist. Furthermore, perceptions of reduced free will, but not of a change in personal identity of the agent, account for the attenuation of moral responsibility when the agent was manipulated. To the extent that folk thinking is relevant to philosophical debates about the nature of moral responsibility, the results helpfully illuminate the dialectical burdens facing competing conceptions of responsible agency.