Confidence judgments in syllogistic reasoning: the role of consistency and response cardinality

In two experiments, we examined the resolution of confidence judgments in syllogistic reasoning and their heuristic bases. Based on the assumptions of Koriat's Self-Consistency Model of confidence, we expected the confidence judgments to be related to conclusion consensuality, reflecting the ro...

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Bibliographic Details
Published inThinking & reasoning Vol. 25; no. 1; pp. 14 - 47
Main Authors Bajšanski, Igor, Žauhar, Valnea, Valerjev, Pavle
Format Journal Article
LanguageEnglish
Published Hove Routledge 02.01.2019
Taylor & Francis Ltd
Subjects
confidence
Experiments
Logic
meta-reasoning
Metacognition
response cardinality
Rhetoric
self-consistency
Syllogistic reasoning
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Summary:In two experiments, we examined the resolution of confidence judgments in syllogistic reasoning and their heuristic bases. Based on the assumptions of Koriat's Self-Consistency Model of confidence, we expected the confidence judgments to be related to conclusion consensuality, reflecting the role of consistency as a heuristic cue to confidence. In Experiment 1, the participants evaluated 24 syllogisms with conclusions that varied with respect to validity and consensuality. In Experiment 2, the participants produced conclusions to 64 pairs of premises. The correlation between confidence and reasoning accuracy was low. In both experiments confidence was related to the consensuality of the responses. For consensually correct items, correlation between confidence and accuracy was positive; however, for consensually incorrect items it was negative. In Experiment 2, confidence was lower for syllogisms with higher response cardinality, or syllogisms that elicited a greater variety of conclusions.
ISSN:1354-6783
1464-0708
DOI:10.1080/13546783.2018.1464506