A causal argument for dualism

Dualism holds (roughly) that some mental events are fundamental and non-physical. I develop a prima facie plausible causal argument for dualism. The argument has several significant implications. First, it constitutes a new way of arguing for dualism. Second, it provides dualists with a parity respo...

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Bibliographic Details
Published inPhilosophical studies Vol. 175; no. 10; pp. 2475 - 2506
Main Author Saad, Bradford
Format Journal Article
LanguageEnglish
Published Dordrecht Springer 01.10.2018
Springer Netherlands
Springer Nature B.V
Subjects
Causality
Dualism
Education
Epistemology
Ethics
Metaphysics
Mind body relationship
Philosophy
Philosophy of Language
Philosophy of Mind
Probability
Physicalism
Interactionism
Mental causation
Mind–body problem
Dualism
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Summary:Dualism holds (roughly) that some mental events are fundamental and non-physical. I develop a prima facie plausible causal argument for dualism. The argument has several significant implications. First, it constitutes a new way of arguing for dualism. Second, it provides dualists with a parity response to causal arguments for physicalism. Third, it transforms the dialectical role of epiphenomenalism. Fourth, it refutes the view that causal considerations prima facie support physicalism but not dualism. After developing the causal argument for dualism and drawing out these implications, I subject the argument to a battery of objections. Some prompt revisions to the argument. Others reveal limitations in scope. It falls out of the discussion that the causal argument for dualism is best used against physicalism as a keystone in a divide and conquer strategy.
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content type line 14
ISSN:0031-8116
1573-0883
DOI:10.1007/s11098-017-0969-3