Anti-intellectualism, egocentrism and bank case intuitions

Salience-sensitivity is a form of anti-intellectualism that says the following: whether a true belief amounts to knowledge depends on which error-possibilities are salient to the believer. I will investigate whether salience-sensitivity can be motivated by appeal to bank case intuitions. I will sugg...

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Bibliographic Details
Published inPhilosophical studies Vol. 175; no. 11; pp. 2841 - 2857
Main Author Dinges, Alexander
Format Journal Article
LanguageEnglish
Published Dordrecht Springer 01.11.2018
Springer Netherlands
Springer Nature B.V
Subjects
Belief & doubt
Education
Epistemology
Errors
Ethics
Intellectualism
Knowledge
Metaphysics
Person
Philosophy
Philosophy of Language
Philosophy of Mind
Salience
Epistemic contextualism
Egocentric bias
Bank cases
Anti-intellectualism
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Summary:Salience-sensitivity is a form of anti-intellectualism that says the following: whether a true belief amounts to knowledge depends on which error-possibilities are salient to the believer. I will investigate whether salience-sensitivity can be motivated by appeal to bank case intuitions. I will suggest that so-called third-person bank cases threaten to sever the connection between bank case intuitions and salience-sensitivity. I will go on to argue that salience-sensitivists can overcome this worry if they appeal to egocentric bias, a general tendency to project our own mental states onto others. I will then suggest that a similar strategy is unavailable to stakes-sensitivists, who hold that whether a true belief amounts to knowledge depends on what is at stake for the believer. Bank case intuitions motivate salience- but not stakes-sensitivity.
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ISSN:0031-8116
1573-0883
DOI:10.1007/s11098-017-0984-4