On Political Competition: Democracy, Opinion and Responsibility

• Published in: Constitutional political economy Vol. 15; no. 2; pp. 187 - 204
• Main Author: Peacock, Mark S
• Format: Journal Article
• Language: English
• Published: New York Springer 01.06.2004; Springer Nature B.V
• Series: Constitutional Political Economy
• Subjects: Analysis; Competition; Constitutional Law; Democracy; Economic analysis; Economic Conditions; Economic growth; Hayek, Friedrich A; Interest rates; Opinion; Opinion formation; Opinions; Political analysis; Political economy; Political theory; Politics; Preferences; Public Opinion; Public Policy; Responsibility; Social justice
• ISSN: 1043-4062; 1572-9966
• DOI: 10.1023/B:COPE.0000029643.66579.36

In this paper, I consider the influence of political competition on opinion. After reflecting on the notion "opinion" as a concept in the economic analysis of politics, I turn to Hayek's Constitution of Liberty and consider his argument for democracy on the grounds that it is the form of government which best promotes progress in opinion. Yet Hayek's claim that democratically formed opinion improves is unsubstantiated. I turn to accounts of expressive voting thereafter to show why opinions which are realised in the form of votes may be anything other than propitious to democratic culture. I then return to Hayek and consider what becomes of "opinion" in Law, Legislation and Liberty. His claim that opinion improves under democratic institutions is no longer of great significance to him. Indeed, his account of the rise of "bargaining politics" provides evidence against the claim that opinion improves. I conclude by asking how democracy can be shielded from opinion, that is, how opinion might be improved in ways which go beyond Hayek's model of political competition outlined in Constitution of Liberty. To this end, I look to accounts of deliberative democracy and expressive politics for support.