The order of move in a conversational war of attrition

• Published in: Economics letters Vol. 228; p. 111181
• Main Author: Decker, Christian
• Format: Journal Article
• Language: English
• Published: Elsevier B.V 01.07.2023
• Subjects: Conversational war of attrition; Debate; First-mover advantage; Order of move; Rubinstein bargaining; C63; First-mover advantage; Debate; Rubinstein bargaining; Conversational war of attrition; Order of move; D72; D83; C72; D71; D82
• ISSN: 0165-1765; 1873-7374
• DOI: 10.1016/j.econlet.2023.111181

This paper investigates computationally when and how the order of move matters in a Conversational War of Attrition (Meyer-ter-Vehn et al., 2018). Switching the first mover flips the debate’s outcome for certain type-realizations and triggers two potentially opposing forces on jurors’ ex-ante expected costs. In the finite-horizon version of the game, a last-proposal advantage prevails if the jurors’ bias dominates their impatience, and a first-proposal advantage prevails if impatience dominates bias. In the infinite-horizon version, there is an unambiguous first-proposal advantage. These mechanisms are reminiscent of the Rubinstein (1982) sequential bargaining game. •Switching the first mover may flip the outcome of a Conversational War of Attrition.•Impatience causes ex-ante a first-proposal advantage.•In a finite debate, an additional force favors the last proposal.•In a finite debate, the first-proposal advantage prevails if impatience dominates bias.•The mechanisms are similar to the Rubinstein sequential bargaining game.