Experience, Subjectivity, Selfhood: Beyond a Meadian Sociology of the Self

Sociologists tend to see G. H. Mead's conceptualization of self as fundamentally correct. In this paper, we develop a critique of Mead's notion of the self as constituted through social interactions. Our focus will be on Mead's categorial distinction between the socially constructed s...

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Bibliographic Details
Published inJournal for the theory of social behaviour Vol. 54; no. 1; pp. 36 - 51
Main Authors Zahavi, Dan, Zelinsky, Dominik
Format Journal Article
LanguageEnglish
Published Oxford Blackwell Publishing Ltd 01.03.2024
Subjects
Experience
Husserl
interactionism
Mead
Personhood
Phenomenology
self
Social interaction
Subjectivity
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Summary:Sociologists tend to see G. H. Mead's conceptualization of self as fundamentally correct. In this paper, we develop a critique of Mead's notion of the self as constituted through social interactions. Our focus will be on Mead's categorial distinction between the socially constructed self and subjective experience, as well as on the tendency of post‐Meadian sociologists to push Mead's position in ever more radical directions. Drawing inspiration from a multifaceted understanding of selfhood that can be found in Husserlian phenomenology, we then propose that the most basic level of selfhood is anchored in irreducible subjective experience.
ISSN:0021-8308
1468-5914
DOI:10.1111/jtsb.12396