An Argument for All‐Luck Egalitarianism

Luck egalitarianism is the view that equality requires the effects of luck on distributive outcomes to be neutralized. Heavily influenced by Ronald Dworkin's work on equality of resources, luck egalitarianism was first systematized by Arneson and Cohen. Over the last three decades, it has come...

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Bibliographic Details
Published inPhilosophy & public affairs Vol. 49; no. 4; pp. 350 - 378
Main Author Knight, Carl
Format Journal Article
LanguageEnglish
Published Hoboken, USA John Wiley & Sons, Inc 01.09.2021
Blackwell Publishing Ltd
Subjects
Anglophones
Chance
Egalitarianism
Equality
Political philosophy
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Summary:Luck egalitarianism is the view that equality requires the effects of luck on distributive outcomes to be neutralized. Heavily influenced by Ronald Dworkin's work on equality of resources, luck egalitarianism was first systematized by Arneson and Cohen. Over the last three decades, it has come to be arguably the most influential theory of equality in Anglophone political philosophy. Standardly, luck egalitarianism is understood as placing decisive weight on Dworkin's distinction between option luck (the upshot of declinable risks) and brute luck (the upshot of non-declinable risks). This "brute-luck egalitarianism" reduces or eliminates the influence of brute luck on distributions, while allowing the influence of option luck to stand.
Bibliography:whose insightful comments have resulted in a much‐improved article. This research was supported by the British Academy. The author declares no conflict of interest.
Earlier versions of this article were presented at the Political Theory Group, University of Glasgow; the Philosophy Society, University of Glasgow; the Political Theory Research Group, University of Edinburgh; the Society for Applied Philosophy Annual Conference, University of Edinburgh; the Association for Legal and Social Philosophy Annual Conference, University of Stirling; a Hoover Chair workshop, Université Catholique de Louvain; and an Equality of Opportunity workshop, Duke University School of Law. I am grateful for feedback from many participants on these occasions, including Matt Adler, Andreas Albertsen, Dick Arneson, Nir Eyal, Axel Gosseries, Refia Kadayifci, Kieran Oberman, Johan Olsthoorn, Colin Rowe, Jesse Tomalty, and Alex Voorhoeve. I would especially like to thank two Associate Editors for
Philosophy & Public Affairs
ISSN:0048-3915
1088-4963
DOI:10.1111/papa.12200