Designing Virus-Resistant, High-Performance Networks: A Game-Formation Approach

Designing an optimal network topology while balancing multiple, possibly conflicting objectives such as cost, performance, and resiliency to viruses is a challenging endeavor, let alone in the case of decentralized network formation. We, therefore, propose a game-formation technique where each playe...

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Bibliographic Details
Published inIEEE transactions on control of network systems Vol. 5; no. 4; pp. 1682 - 1692
Main Authors Trajanovski, Stojan, Kuipers, Fernando A., Hayel, Yezekael, Altman, Eitan, Van Mieghem, Piet
Format Journal Article
LanguageEnglish
Published Piscataway IEEE 01.12.2018
The Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers, Inc. (IEEE)
Subjects
Autonomous agents
Design standards
Game theory
Games
Incentives
Nash equilibrium
network design
Network formation
network performance
Network topologies
Network topology
networks of autonomous agents
Peer-to-peer computing
virus spread
Viruses
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Summary:Designing an optimal network topology while balancing multiple, possibly conflicting objectives such as cost, performance, and resiliency to viruses is a challenging endeavor, let alone in the case of decentralized network formation. We, therefore, propose a game-formation technique where each player aims to minimize its cost in installing links, the probability of being infected by a virus, and the sum of hopcounts on its shortest paths to all other nodes. In this paper, we first determine the Nash equilibria and the price of anarchy (PoA) for our novel network formation game, second demonstrate that the PoA is usually low, which suggests that (near-)optimal topologies can be formed in a decentralized way, and third give suggestions for practitioners for those cases where the PoA is high and some centralized control/incentives are advisable.
ISSN:2325-5870
2325-5870
2372-2533
DOI:10.1109/TCNS.2017.2747840