Searchable Symmetric Encryption with Forward Search Privacy

• Published in: IEEE transactions on dependable and secure computing Vol. 18; no. 1; pp. 460 - 474
• Main Authors: Li, Jin, Huang, Yanyu, Wei, Yu, Lv, Siyi, Liu, Zheli, Dong, Changyu, Lou, Wenjing
• Format: Journal Article
• Language: English
• Published: Washington IEEE 01.01.2021; IEEE Computer Society
• Subjects: Data privacy; Encryption; forward privacy; forward search privacy; Indexes; Privacy; Probabilistic logic; Queries; Searchable encryption; Searching; Security
• ISSN: 1545-5971; 1941-0018
• DOI: 10.1109/TDSC.2019.2894411

Searchable symmetric encryption (SSE) has been widely applied in the encrypted database for queries in practice. Although SSE is powerful and feature-rich, it is always plagued by information leaks. Some recent attacks point out that forward privacy which disallows leakage from update operations, now becomes a basic requirement for any newly designed SSE schemes. However, the subsequent search operations can still leak a significant amount of information. To further strengthen security, we extend the definition of forward privacy and propose the notion of "forward search privacy". Intuitively, it requires search operations over newly added documents do not leak any information about past queries. The enhanced security notion poses new challenges to the design of SSE. We address the challenges by developing the hidden pointer technique (HPT) and propose a new SSE scheme called Khons , which satisfies our security notion (with the original forward privacy notion) and is also efficient. We implemented Khons and our experiment results on large dataset (wikipedia) show that it is more efficient than existing SSE schemes with forward privacy.