A Stay-in-a-Set Game without a Stationary Equilibrium

We give an example of a finite-state two-player turn-based stochastic game with safety objectives for both players which has no stationary Nash equilibrium. This answers an open question of Secchi and Sudderth.

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Bibliographic Details
Published in	Electronic proceedings in theoretical computer science Vol. 305; no. Proc. GandALF 2019; pp. 83 - 90
Main Authors	Hansen, Kristoffer Arnsfelt, Raskin, Mikhail
Format	Journal Article
Language	English
Published	Open Publishing Association 18.09.2019
Online Access	Get full text

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Summary:	We give an example of a finite-state two-player turn-based stochastic game with safety objectives for both players which has no stationary Nash equilibrium. This answers an open question of Secchi and Sudderth.
ISSN:	2075-2180 2075-2180
DOI:	10.4204/EPTCS.305.6