Steep Hierarchies without Skew? Modeling How Ecology and Decision-Making Shape Despotism of Relationships
AbstractAnimals can form dominance relationships that vary from highly unequal, or despotic, to egalitarian, and this variation likely impacts the fitness of individuals. How and why these differences in relationships and fitness exist among groups, populations, and species has been the subject of m...
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Published in | The American naturalist Vol. 203; no. 2; p. 189 |
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Main Authors | , , |
Format | Journal Article |
Language | English |
Published |
United States
01.02.2024
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Subjects | |
Online Access | Get more information |
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Summary: | AbstractAnimals can form dominance relationships that vary from highly unequal, or despotic, to egalitarian, and this variation likely impacts the fitness of individuals. How and why these differences in relationships and fitness exist among groups, populations, and species has been the subject of much debate. Here, we investigated the influence of two major factors: (1) spatial resource distribution and (2) the presence or absence of winner-loser effects. To determine the effects of these factors, we built an agent-based model that represented 10 agents directly competing over food resources on a simple landscape. By varying the food distribution and using either asymmetry of strength or experience, we contrasted four scenarios from which we recorded attack decisions, fight outcomes, and individual energy intake to calculate dominance hierarchy steepness and energetic skew. Surprisingly, resource distribution and winner-loser effects did not have the predicted effects on hierarchy steepness. However, skew in energy intake arose when resources were distributed heterogeneously, despite hierarchy steepness frequently being higher in the homogeneous resource scenarios. Thus, this study confirms some decades-old predictions about feeding competition but also casts doubt on the ability to infer energetic consequences from observations of agonistic interactions. |
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ISSN: | 1537-5323 |
DOI: | 10.1086/727702 |