Political Representation and Legislative Bargaining over Redistribution

The theories of dynamic legislative bargaining have supposed that the distribution of legislators are constant across periods. In reality, a transition in the economic condition makes people change the candidate they vote for and politicians alter their opinions. Regarding the redistribution and ine...

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Bibliographic Details
Published inInternational advances in economic research Vol. 25; no. 3; pp. 251 - 262
Main Author Saito, Yuta
Format Journal Article
LanguageEnglish
Published New York Springer US 01.08.2019
Springer Nature B.V
Subjects
Economic Growth
Economic models
Economics
Economics and Finance
International Economics
Macroeconomics/Monetary Economics//Financial Economics
Microeconomics
Political representation
E62
E20
E00
Dynamic bargaining
Political representation
Capital taxation
D70
Inequality
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Summary:The theories of dynamic legislative bargaining have supposed that the distribution of legislators are constant across periods. In reality, a transition in the economic condition makes people change the candidate they vote for and politicians alter their opinions. Regarding the redistribution and inequality issue, a redistribution policy affects the future legislators’ policy preferences via influencing the economic inequality among the people. This paper recognizes such a feedback effect and investigates its effect on the outcomes in the legislature. This finding suggests that a high political representation causes a high capital accumulation associated with a low expected tax rate. Socially efficient allocation can be reached only if the political representation is perfect.
ISSN:1083-0898
1573-966X
DOI:10.1007/s11294-019-09749-0