Political Representation and Legislative Bargaining over Redistribution
The theories of dynamic legislative bargaining have supposed that the distribution of legislators are constant across periods. In reality, a transition in the economic condition makes people change the candidate they vote for and politicians alter their opinions. Regarding the redistribution and ine...
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Published in | International advances in economic research Vol. 25; no. 3; pp. 251 - 262 |
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Main Author | |
Format | Journal Article |
Language | English |
Published |
New York
Springer US
01.08.2019
Springer Nature B.V |
Subjects | |
Online Access | Get full text |
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Summary: | The theories of dynamic legislative bargaining have supposed that the distribution of legislators are constant across periods. In reality, a transition in the economic condition makes people change the candidate they vote for and politicians alter their opinions. Regarding the redistribution and inequality issue, a redistribution policy affects the future legislators’ policy preferences via influencing the economic inequality among the people. This paper recognizes such a feedback effect and investigates its effect on the outcomes in the legislature. This finding suggests that a high political representation causes a high capital accumulation associated with a low expected tax rate. Socially efficient allocation can be reached only if the political representation is perfect. |
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ISSN: | 1083-0898 1573-966X |
DOI: | 10.1007/s11294-019-09749-0 |