Fear of Crowds in World Trade Organization Disputes Why Don’t More Countries Participate?

• Published in: The Journal of politics Vol. 78; no. 1; pp. 88 - 104
• Main Authors: Johns, Leslie, Pelc, Krzysztof J.
• Format: Journal Article
• Language: English
• Published: Chicago University of Chicago on behalf of the Southern Political Science Association 01.01.2016; University of Chicago Press
• Subjects: Cost-benefit analysis; Disputes; Governance; Litigation; Negotiations; Participation; Political behavior; Political parties; Political power; Power; Trade; dispute settlement; international cooperation; WTO; international political economy
• ISSN: 0022-3816; 1468-2508
• DOI: 10.1086/683193

The participation deficit in global governance is usually blamed on power politics; we argue it may actually reflect strategic behavior by excluded countries themselves. In the World Trade Organization, member-states affected by a trade dispute can join litigation as “third parties” to gain access to otherwise private negotiations. In spite of its considerable benefit and negligible cost, third-party participation remains rare. Countries often stay out even when they have a material interest at stake. Why is this? We argue that because the presence of third parties decreases the odds of a settlement and increases the odds of litigation, strategic states may choose to stay out to avoid acting as involuntary spoilers. All states benefit from a swift resolution to trade disputes, so the benefit of participation decreases as more states join a case. We test our model by examining each country’s decision to participate or not in every WTO dispute since 1995. The findings support our theory: states shy away from joining when it is too crowded.