The nature of epistemic feelings

Among the phenomena that make up the mind, cognitive psychologists and philosophers have postulated a puzzling one that they have called "epistemic feelings." This paper aims to (1) characterize these experiences according to their intentional content and phenomenal character, and (2) desc...

Full description

Saved in:
Bibliographic Details
Published inPhilosophical psychology Vol. 27; no. 2; pp. 193 - 211
Main Author Arango-Muñoz, Santiago
Format Journal Article
LanguageEnglish
Published Abingdon Taylor & Francis Group 01.04.2014
Taylor & Francis Ltd
Subjects
Cognitive psychology
Emotions
Epistemology
Feelings
Heuristic
Mental Actions
Metacognition
Nonconceptual Content
Philosophers
Online AccessGet full text

Cover

More Information
Summary:Among the phenomena that make up the mind, cognitive psychologists and philosophers have postulated a puzzling one that they have called "epistemic feelings." This paper aims to (1) characterize these experiences according to their intentional content and phenomenal character, and (2) describe the nature of these mental states as nonconceptual in the cases of animals and infants, and as conceptual mental states in the case of adult human beings. Finally, (3) the paper will contrast three accounts of the causes and mechanisms of epistemic feelings: the doxastic account; the mental scanner account; and the heuristic mechanism account. The paper will argue in favor of the heuristic mechanism account.
ISSN:0951-5089
1465-394X
DOI:10.1080/09515089.2012.732002