Restricting Factiveness

• Published in: Philosophical studies Vol. 146; no. 1; pp. 29 - 48
• Main Author: Stjernberg, Fredrik
• Format: Journal Article
• Language: English
• Published: Dordrecht Springer 01.10.2009; Springer Netherlands; Springer Nature B.V
• Subjects: Education; Empirical evidence; Encyclopedias; Epistemology; Epistemology. Philosophy of science. Theory of knowledge; Ethics; Factiveness; Fitchs knowability paradox; Intuition; Justified beliefs; Knower paradox; Knowledge; Metaphysics; Modus ponens; Paradoxes; Philosophy; Philosophy of Language; Philosophy of Mind; Reasoning; SAMHÄLLSVETENSKAP; Skepticism; SOCIAL SCIENCES; Truth; Verificationism; Factiveness; Knower paradox; Knowledge; Fitch’s knowability paradox
• ISSN: 0031-8116; 1573-0883
• DOI: 10.1007/s11098-008-9243-z

In discussions of Fitch's paradox, it is usually assumed without further argument that knowledge is factive, that if a subject knows that p, then p is true. It is argued that this common assumption is not as well-founded as it should be, and that there in fact are certain reasons to be suspicious of the unrestricted version of the factiveness claim. There are two kinds of reason for this suspicion. One is that unrestricted factiveness leads to paradoxes and unexpected results, the other is that the usual arguments for factiveness are not as compelling as is commonly thought. There may in fact be some kinds of contexts, where factiveness doesn't hold for knowledge—the usual arguments for factiveness don't suffice to support the claim that knowledge is unrestrictedly factive. Perhaps all that can be shown is that knowledge is at times factive, or that it is default factive, as it were: this doesn't show that there can't be counterexamples, however. Certain aspects of knowledge without unrestricted factiveness are examined briefly.