Dueling incumbent primaries in U.S. House elections

• Published in: Social science quarterly Vol. 104; no. 2; pp. 125 - 139
• Main Authors: Ashton, H. Benjamin, Crespin, Michael H., McKee, Seth C.
• Format: Journal Article
• Language: English
• Published: Oxford Blackwell Publishing Ltd 01.03.2023
• Subjects: Apportionment; Congressional elections; Constituents; Elections; Incumbency; Legislative districts; Primaries & caucuses; Redistricting
• ISSN: 0038-4941; 1540-6237
• DOI: 10.1111/ssqu.13253

Objective Reapportionment and the attendant process of redistricting cause instances where incumbents are faced with the decision to retire or run against a congressional colleague. We investigate two major questions surrounding the previously understudied population of dueling incumbent primaries: First, under what conditions is a dueling incumbent primary likely to manifest? Second, how are dueling incumbent primaries different from the typical primary featuring a single incumbent? Methods We address these questions using a novel dataset aggregating descriptive congressional district information on these contests from 1962 to 2016, and separately for 2022. Results Our findings show these contests primarily emerge via electoral retrenchment, meaning a state loses representation in reapportionment. Dueling incumbent primaries also arise from the strategic calculations of partisan line drawers. Conclusions Not only do dueling incumbent primaries comprise a disproportionate share of incumbent defeats, but compared to single incumbent contests, primary duels feature very high redrawn constituencies, voters new to these incumbents, and this reality contributes to the high‐risk/reward nature of these rare but electorally consequential contests.