Cheating in a contest with strategic inspection

We analyze a game between three players: two Athletes and an Inspector. Two athletes compete with each other and both may cheat to increase their chances of victory. The Inspector wishes to detect incidents of cheating, and performs tests on athletes to detect cheating. The test is costly for the In...

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Bibliographic Details
Published inTheory and decision Vol. 85; no. 3-4; pp. 375 - 387
Main Authors Elaad, Guy, Jelnov, Artyom
Format Journal Article
LanguageEnglish
Published New York Springer US 01.10.2018
Springer Nature B.V
Subjects
Athletes
Behavioral/Experimental Economics
Cheating
Economic Theory/Quantitative Economics/Mathematical Methods
Economics
Economics and Finance
Finance
Game Theory
Inspection
Insurance
Management
Operations Research/Decision Theory
Social and Behav. Sciences
Statistics for Business
Inspection
Cheating
Contest
Doping
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Summary:We analyze a game between three players: two Athletes and an Inspector. Two athletes compete with each other and both may cheat to increase their chances of victory. The Inspector wishes to detect incidents of cheating, and performs tests on athletes to detect cheating. The test is costly for the Inspector. Both probability of cheating and that of testing decrease as cost of inspection diminishes.
ISSN:0040-5833
1573-7187
DOI:10.1007/s11238-018-9669-5