Interest relativism in the best system analysis of laws

• Published in: Synthese (Dordrecht) Vol. 194; no. 12; pp. 4643 - 4655
• Main Author: Bialek, Max
• Format: Journal Article
• Language: English
• Published: Dordrecht Springer Science + Business Media 01.12.2017; Springer Netherlands; Springer Nature B.V
• Subjects: Education; Epistemology; Logic; Metaphysics; Natural law; Philosophy; Philosophy of Language; Philosophy of Science; Relativism; S.I.: OBJECTIVITY IN SCIENCE; Scientific method; Systems analysis; Laws of nature; Scientific practice; Best systems analysis; Relativity
• ISSN: 0039-7857; 1573-0964
• DOI: 10.1007/s11229-016-1203-0

Lewis’ Best System Analysis (BSA) of laws of nature is often criticized on the grounds that what it means to be the “best” system is too subjective for an analysis of lawhood. Recent proponents of the BSA have embraced the view’s close connection to the particulars of scientific practice despite the objection. I distinguish two compatible versions of the objection: one opposed to mind or subject dependence and the other opposed to relativity. The BSA can answer both. Answering the antirelative version of Armstrong’s objection requires that the BSA be no more or less relative than is required by scientific practice. A spectrum of relativity is introduced with extremes of minimally and maximally relative variants of the BSA, and extant variants of the BSA are located on it. Lastly, I sketch what work remains to be done with respect to Armstrong’s objection by BSA proponents depending on where in the spectrum of relativity they hope to locate their view.