Amphibians and the Particular-Universal Distinction

I defend a new conception of the particular-universal distinction based on considerations about what David Lewis calls 'amphibians'. I argue, first, that given the possibility of amphibians, two recently popular conceptions of the particular-universal distinction, namely the repeatability...

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Bibliographic Details
Published inAustralasian journal of philosophy Vol. 102; no. 2; pp. 278 - 292
Main Author Ou, Chiao-Li
Format Journal Article
LanguageEnglish
Published Oxford Routledge 02.04.2024
Taylor & Francis Ltd
Subjects
amphibians
Bias
Literary devices
particular-universal distinction
particulars
Reptiles & amphibians
tropes
universals
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Summary:I defend a new conception of the particular-universal distinction based on considerations about what David Lewis calls 'amphibians'. I argue, first, that given the possibility of amphibians, two recently popular conceptions of the particular-universal distinction, namely the repeatability conception and the duplicability conception, are both objectionable since they are biased in one way or another. I then propose a more flexible conception that solves this problem by regarding amphibians as belonging to a sui generis sort of property distinct from what I call 'strong universals' and 'strong tropes'. Finally, I respond to some objections directed at this new account.
ISSN:0004-8402
1471-6828
DOI:10.1080/00048402.2023.2264860