James M. Buchanan and Gordon Tullock on the Weaknesses of Majority Voting: A Triptych

This paper provides a narrative of the different but complementary accounts of James M. Buchanan and Gordon Tullock on the weaknesses of simple majority voting. The paper shows that these authors took different paths to reach the same conclusion. Buchanan used his knowledge about Knut Wicksell which...

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Bibliographic Details
Published inIDEAS Working Paper Series from RePEc Vol. 11; no. 11-1; pp. 49 - 76
Main Author Grandjean, Julien
Format Journal Article Paper
LanguageEnglish
Published St. Louis Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis 01.03.2021
NecPlus/Association Œconomia
Association Œconomia
Subjects
Buchanan (James)
Economics and Finance
Humanities and Social Sciences
logrolling
majority voting
public choice
Tullock (Gordon)
unanimity
Vote majoritaire
Unanimity
Choix publics
Echange de vote
Unanimité
Logrolling
Public choice
Buchanan (James)
Tullock (Gordon)
Majority voting
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Summary:This paper provides a narrative of the different but complementary accounts of James M. Buchanan and Gordon Tullock on the weaknesses of simple majority voting. The paper shows that these authors took different paths to reach the same conclusion. Buchanan used his knowledge about Knut Wicksell which he applied to an abstract framework. Tullock was inspired by his reading of Duncan Black and Anthony Downs and between 1959 and 1961 in particular, produced numerous published and unpublished works which formed the basis of his contribution to The Calculus of Consent. This book which was jointly authored by Tullock and Buchanan proposes a theoretical reflection on majority voting. The present paper examines Buchanan and Tullock's critique of majority voting and highlights the radical but overlooked contribution made by Tullock to the book and to the development of the Virginia public choice research program.
ISSN:2113-5207
2269-8450
DOI:10.4000/oeconomia.10780