Love and Benevolence in Hutcheson's and Hume's Theories of the Passions

Asks why Francis Hutcheson implies that love necessarily includes a desire for the happiness of the agent esteemed, while David Hume regards love as a passion that itself does not motivate but is contingently or psychologically connected to one which does, benevolence. Uses moral love as a case stud...

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Bibliographic Details
Published inBritish journal for the history of philosophy Vol. 12; no. 4; pp. 631 - 653
Main Author Radcliffe, Elizabeth S.
Format Journal Article
LanguageEnglish
Published Abingdon Taylor & Francis Group 01.11.2004
Taylor & Francis
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Summary:Asks why Francis Hutcheson implies that love necessarily includes a desire for the happiness of the agent esteemed, while David Hume regards love as a passion that itself does not motivate but is contingently or psychologically connected to one which does, benevolence. Uses moral love as a case study to bring to light some significant differences between Hutcheson's and Hume's respective notions of necessity as applied to their individual theories of the passions. (Quotes from original text)
Bibliography:ObjectType-Article-2
SourceType-Scholarly Journals-1
ObjectType-Feature-1
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ISSN:0960-8788
1469-3526
DOI:10.1080/0960878042000279305