Love and Benevolence in Hutcheson's and Hume's Theories of the Passions
Asks why Francis Hutcheson implies that love necessarily includes a desire for the happiness of the agent esteemed, while David Hume regards love as a passion that itself does not motivate but is contingently or psychologically connected to one which does, benevolence. Uses moral love as a case stud...
Saved in:
Published in | British journal for the history of philosophy Vol. 12; no. 4; pp. 631 - 653 |
---|---|
Main Author | |
Format | Journal Article |
Language | English |
Published |
Abingdon
Taylor & Francis Group
01.11.2004
Taylor & Francis |
Subjects | |
Online Access | Get full text |
Cover
Loading…
Summary: | Asks why Francis Hutcheson implies that love necessarily includes a desire for the happiness of the agent esteemed, while David Hume regards love as a passion that itself does not motivate but is contingently or psychologically connected to one which does, benevolence. Uses moral love as a case study to bring to light some significant differences between Hutcheson's and Hume's respective notions of necessity as applied to their individual theories of the passions. (Quotes from original text) |
---|---|
Bibliography: | ObjectType-Article-2 SourceType-Scholarly Journals-1 ObjectType-Feature-1 content type line 23 |
ISSN: | 0960-8788 1469-3526 |
DOI: | 10.1080/0960878042000279305 |