REPLY TO GOLDMAN: CUTTING UP THE ONE TO SAVE THE FIVE IN EPISTEMOLOGY

I argue that Alvin Goldman has failed to save process reliabilism from my critique in earlier work of consequentialist or teleological epistemic theories. First, Goldman misconstrues the nature of my challenge: two of the cases he discusses I never claimed to be counterexamples to process reliabilis...

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Bibliographic Details
Published inEpisteme Vol. 12; no. 2; pp. 145 - 153
Main Author Berker, Selim
Format Journal Article
LanguageEnglish
Published Cambridge, UK Cambridge University Press 01.06.2015
Subjects
Epistemology
Philosophy
Teleology
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Summary:I argue that Alvin Goldman has failed to save process reliabilism from my critique in earlier work of consequentialist or teleological epistemic theories. First, Goldman misconstrues the nature of my challenge: two of the cases he discusses I never claimed to be counterexamples to process reliabilism. Second, Goldman's reply to the type of case I actually claimed to be a counterexample to process reliabilism is unsuccessful. He proposes a variety of responses, but all of them either feature an implausible restriction on process types, or fail to rule out cases with the sort of structure that generates the worry, or both.
ISSN:1742-3600
1750-0117
DOI:10.1017/epi.2015.3