Inter Arma Silent Leges? Democracy, Domestic Terrorism, and Diversion

This article develops expectations about the use of military force by democracies feeing domestic terrorism. Due to the necessity of balancing effective counterterrorism with liberal acceptability, domestic terrorism typically represents a significant but nonexistential threat to democracies that is...

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Bibliographic Details
Published inThe Journal of conflict resolution Vol. 61; no. 7; pp. 1371 - 1400
Main Author Foster, Dennis M.
Format Journal Article
LanguageEnglish
Published Los Angeles, CA SAGE Publishing 01.08.2017
SAGE Publications
SAGE PUBLICATIONS, INC
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Summary:This article develops expectations about the use of military force by democracies feeing domestic terrorism. Due to the necessity of balancing effective counterterrorism with liberal acceptability, domestic terrorism typically represents a significant but nonexistential threat to democracies that is ineradicable via repression; as such, it is likely to generate appreciable diversionary incentives. Moreover, the use of force abroad, coupled with counterterrorist strategies that seek to safeguard democratic legitimacy, allows leaders to provide benefits both to citizens who seek retribution against terrorists and to those who value the preservation of liberty. Tests of the correlates of dispute initiation across all democracies, 1970–2000, provide support for this hypothesis. Further analyses reveal that diversion from domestic terrorism is most likely by democratic governments with relatively greater diversionary capacity and with lesser repressive capacity and incentive.
ISSN:0022-0027
1552-8766
DOI:10.1177/0022002715613842