Van Fraassen’s Unappreciated Realism

What is not often noted about Bas van Fraassen’s distinctive approach to the scientific realism issue is that constructive empiricism, as he defines it, seems to involve a distinctively realist stance in regard to large parts of natural science. This apparent defection from the ranks of his more unc...

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Bibliographic Details
Published inPhilosophy of science Vol. 70; no. 3; pp. 455 - 478
Main Author McMullin, Ernan
Format Journal Article
LanguageEnglish
Published Chicago, IL The University of Chicago Press 01.07.2003
University of Chicago Press
Cambridge University Press
Subjects
Bas van Fraassen
Constructive empiricism
Empirical adequacy
Empiricism
Epistemology
Epistemology. Philosophy of science. Theory of knowledge
Inference
Methodology
Natural sciences
Phenomena
Philosophers
Philosophical realism
Philosophy
Philosophy of science
Quantum mechanics
Realism
Science
Scientific realism
Theoretical entity
Truth
Van Fraassen, Bas
Retroaction
Antirealism
Van Fraassen (B. C.)
Explanation
Empiricism
Realism
Observation
Inference
Natural science
Constructivism
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Summary:What is not often noted about Bas van Fraassen’s distinctive approach to the scientific realism issue is that constructive empiricism, as he defines it, seems to involve a distinctively realist stance in regard to large parts of natural science. This apparent defection from the ranks of his more uncompromisingly anti‐realist colleagues raises many questions. Is hereallyleaning to realism here? If he is, why is this not more widely noted? And, more important, if he is, is he entitled to this shyly realist concession? Does his many‐pronged attack on what he sees as the main arguments in support of realism leave him with the wherewithal?
Bibliography:ObjectType-Article-2
SourceType-Scholarly Journals-1
ObjectType-Feature-1
content type line 23
ISSN:0031-8248
1539-767X
DOI:10.1086/376923