Supply chain coordination with product line design and a revenue sharing scheme

• Published in: Naval research logistics Vol. 66; no. 3; pp. 213 - 229
• Main Authors: Hsiao, Lu, Chen, Ying‐Ju, Xiong, Hui
• Format: Journal Article
• Language: English
• Published: Hoboken, USA John Wiley & Sons, Inc 01.04.2019; Wiley Subscription Services, Inc
• Subjects: Consumers; game theory; product line design; Ratios; Revenue; Revenue sharing; supply chain coordination; Supply chains; Willingness to pay
• ISSN: 0894-069X; 1520-6750
• DOI: 10.1002/nav.21836

Many manufacturers sell their products through retailers and share the revenue with those retailers. Given this phenomenon, we build a stylized model to investigate the role of revenue sharing schemes in supply chain coordination and product variety decisions. In our model, a monopolistic manufacturer serves two segments of consumers, which are distinguished by their willingness to pay for quality. In the scenario with exogenous revenue sharing ratios, when the potential gain from serving the low segment is substantial (e.g., the low‐segment consumers' willingness to pay is high enough or the low segment takes a large enough proportion of the market), the retailer is better off abandoning the revenue sharing scheme. Moreover, when the potential gain from serving the low (high) segment is substantial enough, the manufacturer finds it profitable to offer a single product. Furthermore, when revenue sharing ratios are endogenous, we divide our analysis into two cases, depending on the methods of cooperation. When revenue sharing ratios are negotiated at the very beginning, the decentralized supply chain causes further distortion. This suggests that the central premise of revenue sharing—the coordination of supply chains—may be undermined if supply chain parties meticulously bargain over it.