Insider Forgery Cryptanalysis of Two Post-Quantum Multi-Signature Schemes

• Published in: Applied Mechanics and Materials Vol. 437; no. Industrial Design and Mechanics Power II; pp. 876 - 879
• Main Authors: Kong, Fan Yu, Zhou, Da Shui, Yu, Jia, Diao, Lu Hong, Jiang, Ya Li
• Format: Journal Article
• Language: English
• Published: Zurich Trans Tech Publications Ltd 01.10.2013
• Subjects: Cryptography; Decoding; Error correcting codes; Forges; Security; Signatures; Digital Signature; Error Correcting Codes; Multi-Signature Scheme; Post-Quantum Cryptography
• ISBN: 9783037858967; 3037858966
• ISSN: 1660-9336; 1662-7482; 1662-7482
• DOI: 10.4028/www.scientific.net/AMM.437.876

In 2010, M. Meziani and P.-L. Cayrel presented two post-quantum multi-signature schemes based on the syndrome decoding hard problem and error correcting codes. In this paper, we propose the insider forgery cryptanalysis of M. Meziani et al.s post-quantum multi-signature schemes. In M. Meziani et al.s schemes, the verifier only verifies the final multi-signature and does not check the validity of the partial signatures generated by other signers. Thus the malicious last signer can forge a valid multi-signature by himself/herself on behalf of the group of signers, which can pass the verification of the verifier. Therefore, M. Meziani et al.s post-quantum multi-signature schemes do not meet the security requirements of multi-signature schemes.