Byzantine Attack and Defense in Cognitive Radio Networks: A Survey

• Published in: IEEE Communications surveys and tutorials Vol. 17; no. 3; pp. 1342 - 1363
• Main Authors: Linyuan Zhang, Guoru Ding, Qihui Wu, Yulong Zou, Zhu Han, Jinlong Wang
• Format: Journal Article
• Language: English
• Published: IEEE 01.01.2015
• Subjects: Byzantine attack; Byzantine defense; Cascading style sheets; Cognitive radio networks; cooperative spectrum sensing; data falsification; Security; Sensors; Sociology; Statistics; Testing; Tutorials; Byzantine defense; Cognitive radio networks; data falsification; Byzantine attack; cooperative spectrum sensing
• ISSN: 2373-745X
• DOI: 10.1109/COMST.2015.2422735

The Byzantine attack in cooperative spectrum sensing (CSS), also known as the spectrum sensing data falsification (SSDF) attack in the literature, is one of the key adversaries to the success of cognitive radio networks (CRNs). Over the past couple of years, the research on the Byzantine attack and defense strategies has gained worldwide increasing attention. In this paper, we provide a comprehensive survey and tutorial on the recent advances in the Byzantine attack and defense for CSS in CRNs. Specifically, we first briefly present the preliminaries of CSS for general readers, including signal detection techniques, hypothesis testing, and data fusion. Second, we propose a taxonomy of the existing Byzantine attack behaviors and elaborate on the corresponding attack parameters, which determine where, who, how, and when to launch attacks. Then, from the perspectives of homogeneous or heterogeneous scenarios, we classify the existing defense algorithms, and provide an in-depth tutorial on the state-of-the-art Byzantine defense schemes, commonly known as robust or secure CSS in the literature. Furthermore, we analyze the spear-and-shield relation between Byzantine attack and defense from an interactive game-theoretical perspective. Moreover, we highlight the unsolved research challenges and depict the future research directions.