Evolutional Game Analysis of Quality Regulation of a Blockchain Platform for Emergency Material Security in Emergencies Based on Prospect Theory

• Published in: Systems (Basel) Vol. 13; no. 2; p. 130
• Main Authors: Long, Xiaoliang, Lan, Liqi, Ma, Wenjing, Xiong, Li
• Format: Journal Article
• Language: English
• Published: Basel MDPI AG 01.02.2025
• Subjects: Accounting; Behavior; Blockchain; Cooperation; Counterfeiting; Decision making; Emergencies; emergency material security; Evolution; evolutionary game; Game theory; Laws, regulations and rules; Logistics; Personal protective equipment; Political aspects; prospect theory; Public health; quality supervision; Rationality; Regulation; Risk perception; Security; Suppliers; Supplies; Supply chains; Vaccines; Florida
• ISSN: 2079-8954; 2079-8954
• DOI: 10.3390/systems13020130

To enhance the security and supervision of emergency materials from their source to transport, thus preventing safety incidents, a tripartite evolution model integrating the government, material production enterprises, and logistics entities is proposed. This model, situated within the framework of a government-established blockchain platform, combines evolutionary game theory and prospect theory. It examines the strategy evolution of emergency material’s security subjects amid diverse government reward punishment measures and enterprise risk perceptions. Our findings indicate that employing dynamic reward–punishment measures not only conserves government regulatory resources but also incentivizes enterprises to enhance the quality of emergency materials security. This dynamic approach effectively encourages responsible behavior, averting rebellious tendencies or speculative mindsets in enterprises with deviating risk perceptions regarding emergency materials security.