Problems with the dual-systems approach to temporal cognition

Contrary to Hoerl & McCormack (H&M), we argue that the best account of temporal cognition in humans is one in which a single system becomes capable of representing time. We suggest that H&M's own evidence for dual systems of temporal cognition – simultaneous contradictory beliefs –...

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Bibliographic Details
Published inThe Behavioral and brain sciences Vol. 42; p. e264
Main Authors Melnikoff, David E., Bargh, John A.
Format Journal Article
LanguageEnglish
Published New York, USA Cambridge University Press 01.01.2019
Subjects
Causality
Cognition
Cognition & reasoning
Humans
Hypotheses
Open Peer Commentary
System theory
Systems Analysis
Temporal logic
Winfrey, Oprah
Stonehenge
Online AccessGet full text

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Summary:Contrary to Hoerl & McCormack (H&M), we argue that the best account of temporal cognition in humans is one in which a single system becomes capable of representing time. We suggest that H&M's own evidence for dual systems of temporal cognition – simultaneous contradictory beliefs – does not recommend dual systems, and that the single system approach is more plausible.
Bibliography:ObjectType-Article-2
SourceType-Scholarly Journals-1
ObjectType-Feature-3
content type line 23
ObjectType-Commentary-1
ISSN:0140-525X
1469-1825
DOI:10.1017/S0140525X19000566