From authenticism to alethism: Against McCarroll on observer memory

In opposition to the natural view that observer perspective memory is bound to be inauthentic, McCarroll (2018) argues for the surprising conclusion that memories in which the subject sees himself in the remembered scene are, in many cases, true to the subject’s original experience of the scene. By...

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Bibliographic Details
Published inPhenomenology and the cognitive sciences Vol. 21; no. 4; pp. 835 - 856
Main Authors Michaelian, Kourken, Sant’Anna, André
Format Journal Article
LanguageEnglish
Published Dordrecht Springer Netherlands 01.09.2022
Springer Verlag
Subjects
Cognitive Psychology
Education
Humanities and Social Sciences
Phenomenology
Philosophy
Philosophy of Mind
Truth in memory
Preservationism
Authenticity of memory
Observer perspective memory
Constructive memory
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Summary:In opposition to the natural view that observer perspective memory is bound to be inauthentic, McCarroll (2018) argues for the surprising conclusion that memories in which the subject sees himself in the remembered scene are, in many cases, true to the subject’s original experience of the scene. By means of a careful reconstruction of his argument, this paper shows that McCarroll does not succeed in establishing his conclusion. It shows, in fact, that we ought to come to the opposed conclusion that, while it may be possible in principle for observer perspective memory to be authentic, this is unlikely ever to happen in practice. The natural view, in short, is more or less right.
ISSN:1568-7759
1572-8676
DOI:10.1007/s11097-021-09772-9