Restorative Rigging and the Safe Indication Account

Typical Gettieresque scenarios involve a subject, S, using a method, M, of believing something, p, where, normally, M is a reliable indicator of the truth of p, yet, in S's circumstances, M is not reliable: M is deleteriously rigged. A different sort of scenario involves rigging that restores t...

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Bibliographic Details
Published inSynthese (Dordrecht) Vol. 153; no. 1; pp. 161 - 170
Main Author Luper, S.
Format Journal Article
LanguageEnglish
Published Dordrecht Springer 01.11.2006
Springer Nature B.V
Subjects
Barns
Contrafactuals
Counterexamples
Epistemology
Epistemology. Philosophy of science. Theory of knowledge
Externalism
Handbooks
Internalism
Knowledge
Lotteries
Methods
Nautical rigging
Perception
Philosophy
Potable water
Skepticism
Truth
Epistemology;Philosophy of Science
Knowledge
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Summary:Typical Gettieresque scenarios involve a subject, S, using a method, M, of believing something, p, where, normally, M is a reliable indicator of the truth of p, yet, in S's circumstances, M is not reliable: M is deleteriously rigged. A different sort of scenario involves rigging that restores the reliability of a method M that is deleteriously rigged: M is restoratively rigged. Some theorists criticize (among others) the safe indication account of knowledge defended by Luper, Sosa, and Williamson on the grounds that it treats such cases as knowledge. But other theorists also criticize the safe indication account because it treats the cases as examples of ignorance when they are really examples of knowledge. I answer both groups of critics by arguing that (1) restorative rigging can enable us to know things, and (2) restoratively rigged cases can meet the relevant conditions of the safe indication account.
Bibliography:ObjectType-Article-1
SourceType-Scholarly Journals-1
content type line 14
ISSN:0039-7857
1573-0964
DOI:10.1007/s11229-005-6399-3