Stablecoins: Legal restrictions theory and monetary policy

• Published in: Economics letters Vol. 226; p. 111107
• Main Authors: Park, Jaevin, Kwon, Ohik
• Format: Journal Article
• Language: English
• Published: Elsevier B.V 01.05.2023
• Subjects: Channel system; Collateral misrepresentation; Externality; Floor system; floors; jurisprudence; Limited commitment; monetary policy; monitoring; profits and margins; Channel system; E42; E52; Limited commitment; Collateral misrepresentation; E58; Externality; Floor system
• ISSN: 0165-1765; 1873-7374
• DOI: 10.1016/j.econlet.2023.111107

This paper studies the effect of introducing stablecoins on monetary policy implementation. In the model, decentralized issuers can provide the monies by holding reserves and government bonds, but it is costly to monitor their collateral. The competitive equilibrium is suboptimal because the individual issuers cannot internalize the effect of issuing money on aggregate liquidity. In a channel system, the open-market operations are ineffective because the issuers can rewind it until there is no profit. However, the monetary policy is effective in a floor system and welfare can improve as the demand for money can be adjusted by the interest on reserves. •We study the effect of introducing stablecoins on the monetary policy framework.•The allocation is suboptimal when the issuers are subject to limited commitment.•In a channel system the open-market operations is ineffective.•The welfare can improve in a floor system as the monetary policy is effective.