Vagueness and the Metaphysics of Consciousness

An argument is offered for this conditional: If our current concept conscious state is sharp rather than vague, and also correct (at least in respect of its sharpness), then common versions of familiar metaphysical theories of consciousness are false - namely versions of the identity theory, functio...

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Bibliographic Details
Published inPhilosophical studies Vol. 128; no. 3; pp. 515 - 538
Main Author Antony, Michael V.
Format Journal Article
LanguageEnglish
Published Heidelberg Springer 01.04.2006
Sringer
Springer Nature B.V
Subjects
Brain research
Consciousness
Consciousness theory
Eliminative materialism
Functionalism
Identity theory
Intuition
Linguistic ambiguity
Mind and body. Personal identity
Neurophysiology
Philosophy
Physics
Property dualism
Theory
Truth
Consciousness
Theory
Vague
Eliminativism
Conditional
Metaphysics
Identity
Physics
Dualism
Functionalism
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Summary:An argument is offered for this conditional: If our current concept conscious state is sharp rather than vague, and also correct (at least in respect of its sharpness), then common versions of familiar metaphysical theories of consciousness are false - namely versions of the identity theory, functionalism, and dualism that appeal to complex physical or functional properties in identification, realization, or correlation. Reasons are also given for taking seriously the claim that our current concept conscious state is sharp. The paper ends by surveying the theoretical options left open by the concept's sharpness and the truth of the conditional argued for in the paper.
ISSN:0031-8116
1573-0883
DOI:10.1007/s11098-004-7488-8