Causal reasoning

The main focus of this paper is the question as to what it is for an individual to think of her environment in terms of a concept of causation, or causal concepts, in contrast to some more primitive ways in which an individual might pick out or register what are in fact causal phenomena. I show how...

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Bibliographic Details
Published inPhilosophical studies Vol. 152; no. 2; pp. 167 - 179
Main Author Hoerl, Christoph
Format Journal Article
LanguageEnglish
Published Dordrecht Springer 01.01.2011
Springer Netherlands
Springer Nature B.V
Subjects
Cardiovascular disease
Causality
Causation
Child development
Children
Cognition & reasoning
Cognitive development
Cognitive models
Contrafactuals
Deductive reasoning
Determinism
Education
Empiricism
Epistemology
Epistemology. Philosophy of science. Theory of knowledge
Ethics
Handbooks
Metaphysics
Mind
Philosophy
Philosophy of Language
Philosophy of Mind
Philosophy of science
Psychology
Reasoning
New York
Concepts
Causal reasoning
Singular causation
Causal models
Concept
Cognition
Causality
Reasoning
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Summary:The main focus of this paper is the question as to what it is for an individual to think of her environment in terms of a concept of causation, or causal concepts, in contrast to some more primitive ways in which an individual might pick out or register what are in fact causal phenomena. I show how versions of this question arise in the context of two strands of work on causation, represented by Elizabeth Anscombe and Christopher Hitchcock, respectively. I then describe a central type of reasoning that, I suggest, a subject has to be able to engage in, if we are to credit her with causal concepts. I also point out that this type of reasoning turns on the idea of a physical connection between cause and effect, as articulated in recent singularist approaches of causation.
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ISSN:0031-8116
1573-0883
DOI:10.1007/s11098-009-9474-7