Moral Intuitions, Cognitive Psychology, and the Harming-Versus-Not-Aiding Distinction
Kamm examines whether the methods and results of cognitive psychology are relevant to the questions philosophers ask about the form and validity of a moral theory and the methods used in doing moral philosophy. The methods and claims put forth by psychologists Daniel Kahneman and Amos Tversky are co...
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Published in | Ethics Vol. 108; no. 3; pp. 463 - 488 |
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Main Author | |
Format | Journal Article |
Language | English |
Published |
Chicago, IL
University of Chicago Press
01.04.1998
University of Chicago Press, etc University of Chicago, acting through its Press |
Subjects | |
Online Access | Get full text |
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Summary: | Kamm examines whether the methods and results of cognitive psychology are relevant to the questions philosophers ask about the form and validity of a moral theory and the methods used in doing moral philosophy. The methods and claims put forth by psychologists Daniel Kahneman and Amos Tversky are considered, with a focus on their development of prospect theory. |
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Bibliography: | ObjectType-Article-2 SourceType-Scholarly Journals-1 ObjectType-Feature-1 content type line 23 ObjectType-Article-1 ObjectType-Feature-2 |
ISSN: | 0014-1704 1539-297X |
DOI: | 10.1086/233822 |