Moral Intuitions, Cognitive Psychology, and the Harming-Versus-Not-Aiding Distinction

Kamm examines whether the methods and results of cognitive psychology are relevant to the questions philosophers ask about the form and validity of a moral theory and the methods used in doing moral philosophy. The methods and claims put forth by psychologists Daniel Kahneman and Amos Tversky are co...

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Bibliographic Details
Published inEthics Vol. 108; no. 3; pp. 463 - 488
Main Author Kamm, F. M.
Format Journal Article
LanguageEnglish
Published Chicago, IL University of Chicago Press 01.04.1998
University of Chicago Press, etc
University of Chicago, acting through its Press
Subjects
Cognition
Cognitive psychology
Deontology
Ethics
Framing effects
Income taxes
Intuition
Kahneman, Daniel (1934-2024)
Methodology
Moral philosophy
Morality
Morals
Normativity
Philosophy
Philosophy of action
Political Philosophy
Prospect theory
Psychology
Surcharges
Tax exemptions
Theory of values and moral philosophy. Philosophy of action
Tversky, Amos
Deontology
Irrationality
Moral philosophy
Moral
Intuition
Cognitive Psychology
Decision
Experience
Utility
Test
Distribution
Behaviorism
Reasonableness
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Summary:Kamm examines whether the methods and results of cognitive psychology are relevant to the questions philosophers ask about the form and validity of a moral theory and the methods used in doing moral philosophy. The methods and claims put forth by psychologists Daniel Kahneman and Amos Tversky are considered, with a focus on their development of prospect theory.
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ISSN:0014-1704
1539-297X
DOI:10.1086/233822