Auction-Based Resource Reservation in 2.5/3G Networks

• Published in: Mobile networks and applications Vol. 9; no. 6; pp. 557 - 566
• Main Authors: Dramitinos, Manos, Stamoulis, George D., Courcoubetis, Costas
• Format: Journal Article
• Language: English
• Published: New York Springer Nature B.V 01.12.2004
• Subjects: Auctions; Bids; Efficiency; Mathematical models; Mobile communications networks; Resource allocation; Spectrum allocation; Studies; Utility functions; Willingness to pay
• ISSN: 1383-469X; 1572-8153
• DOI: 10.1023/B:MONE.0000042495.27538.af

This paper considers UMTS networks in which users request services other than telephony that last for long time intervals. It defines an auction-based mechanism for nearly consistent reservation of the resources of a UMTS (or GPRS) network by the users that value them the most, in order to satisfy the longer time scale requirements of their service sessions. Each of these sessions has a fixed target bit-rate. The mechanism is based on a series of Generalized Vickrey Auctions and a set of predefined user utility functions that are proposed. Bidding is performed automatically on behalf of the users on the basis of each user's selection of one of these utility functions and his declaration of a total willingness to pay. The effectiveness of this resource reservation mechanism is demonstrated by means of experiments. It appears that most of the users either are served very satisfactorily or essentially are not served at all. The mechanism is implemented at the network base station, and is applicable in practical cases of networks with large numbers of users whose sessions last for many slots.