A rather neoclassical contribution to Marxian rent theory

• Published in: Land economics Vol. 64; no. 2; pp. 196 - 198
• Main Authors: Persky, J, White, W.D
• Format: Journal Article
• Language: English
• Published: Chicago University of Wisconsin Press 01.05.1988
• Subjects: Agricultural land; ALQUILERES; Collusion; ECONOMIA MARXISTA; ECONOMIA NEOCLASICA; Economic rent; Economic theory; ECONOMIE MARXISTE; ECONOMIE NEOCLASSIQUE; FONCTION D'OFFRE; FUNCIONES DE LA OFERTA; Land economics; Landowners; LOYER; Marxian economics; MARXIST ECONOMICS; MODE DE FAIRE VALOIR; MONOPOLE; Monopolies; MONOPOLIO; MONOPOLY; NEOCLASSICAL ECONOMICS; RENTS; Revenue; Speculations; Supply; Supply and demand; SUPPLY FUNCTIONS; TENENCIA; TENURE
• ISSN: 0023-7639; 1543-8325
• DOI: 10.2307/3146824

From a neoclassical perspective, the most telling point in the Marxism analysis of rent is that, by restricting supply, a land monopoly, or substantial collusion among landowners, can obtain total rents greater than those otherwise to be achieved in a competitive market. An attempt is made to: 1. clarify the conditions under which it is beneficial for landowners to collude in a monopolistic manner, and 2. establish the proposition that it is not always necessary for landowners to collude in order to maximize total rent. It is proposed that, in times of farm prosperity when demand is high, it is likely that the marginal revenue curve for the derived demand from land is still positive when the total current supply of land is fully utilized. In bad times, it is likely that the curve is negative long before the full supply is used. Thus, collusion appears more profitable in bad times under conditions of relatively low demand.