Epistemic Luck and Epistemic Risk

We are witnessing a certain tendency in epistemology to account for the anti-luck intuition in terms of risk. I.e., instead of the traditional anti-luck diagnosis of Gettier cases and fake barn cases, a new anti-risk diagnosis seems to be preferable by many. My goal in this paper is twofold: first,...

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Bibliographic Details
Published inErkenntnis Vol. 88; no. 3; pp. 929 - 950
Main Author Navarro, Jesús
Format Journal Article
LanguageEnglish
Published Dordrecht Springer Netherlands 01.03.2023
Springer Nature B.V
Subjects
Education
Epistemology
Ethics
Knowledge
Logic
Ontology
Original Research
Philosophy
Probability
Risk
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Summary:We are witnessing a certain tendency in epistemology to account for the anti-luck intuition in terms of risk. I.e., instead of the traditional anti-luck diagnosis of Gettier cases and fake barn cases, a new anti-risk diagnosis seems to be preferable by many. My goal in this paper is twofold: first, I contribute to motivate that drift; and second, I defend that we ought to partially resist it. An anti-risk diagnosis is valid and preferable for fake barn cases, but we still need an anti-luck diagnosis for classic Gettier cases. The paper thus defends the Solomon-like result that we need both concepts—epistemic luck and epistemic risk—to deal with all the cases where knowledge is undermined.
ISSN:0165-0106
1572-8420
DOI:10.1007/s10670-021-00387-9