Resolutions Against Uniqueness

The paper presents a new argument for epistemic permissivism. The version of permissivism that we defend is a moderate version that applies only to explicit doxastic attitudes. Drawing on Yalcin’s framework for modeling such attitudes, we argue that two fully rational subjects who share all their ev...

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Bibliographic Details
Published inErkenntnis Vol. 88; no. 3; pp. 1013 - 1033
Main Authors Lota, Kenji, Hlobil, Ulf
Format Journal Article
LanguageEnglish
Published Dordrecht Springer Netherlands 01.03.2023
Springer Nature B.V
Subjects
Attitudes
Belief & doubt
Education
Epistemology
Ethics
Evidence
Logic
Ontology
Original Research
Philosophy
Rationality
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Summary:The paper presents a new argument for epistemic permissivism. The version of permissivism that we defend is a moderate version that applies only to explicit doxastic attitudes. Drawing on Yalcin’s framework for modeling such attitudes, we argue that two fully rational subjects who share all their evidence, prior beliefs, and epistemic standards may still differ in the explicit doxastic attitudes that they adopt. This can happen because two such subjects may be sensitive to different questions. Thus, differing intellectual interests can yield failures of uniqueness. This is not a merely pragmatic phenomenon.
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ISSN:0165-0106
1572-8420
DOI:10.1007/s10670-021-00391-z