The Diagonal and the Demon

Reliabilism about epistemic justification - the thesis that what makes a belief epistemically justified is that it was produced by a reliable process of belief-formation - must face two problems. First, what has been called "the new evil demon problem", which arises from the idea that the...

Full description

Saved in:
Bibliographic Details
Published inPhilosophical studies Vol. 110; no. 3; pp. 249 - 266
Main Author COMESANA, Juan
Format Journal Article
LanguageEnglish
Published Heidelberg Kluwer Academic Publishers 01.09.2002
Sringer
Springer Nature B.V
Subjects
Belief
Beliefs
Cafeterias
Cognition & reasoning
Deixis
Epistemic justification
Epistemology
Epistemology. Philosophy of science. Theory of knowledge
Good & evil
Hypotheses
Intensionality
Intuition
Justified beliefs
Modal realism
Philosophy
Reliabilism
Semantics
Skepticism
Subject terms
New York
Belief
Epistemic
Malin génie
Indexicals
Semantics
Reliabilism
Diagonal Argument
Justification
Scepticism
Online AccessGet full text

Cover

More Information
Summary:Reliabilism about epistemic justification - the thesis that what makes a belief epistemically justified is that it was produced by a reliable process of belief-formation - must face two problems. First, what has been called "the new evil demon problem", which arises from the idea that the beliefs of victims of an evil demon are as justified as our own beliefs, although they are not - the objector claims - reliably produced. And second, the problem of diagnosing why skepticism is so appealing despite being false. I present a special version of reliabilism, "indexical reliabilism", based on two-dimensional semantics, and show how it can solve both problems.
Bibliography:ObjectType-Article-1
SourceType-Scholarly Journals-1
content type line 14
ISSN:0031-8116
1573-0883
DOI:10.1023/A:1020656411534