What if We Contain Multiple Morally Relevant Subjects?

First, I introduce the concept of a “non-agential subject,” where a non-agential subject (1) exists within an organism and (2) has phenomenally conscious experiences in a morally significant way, but (3) is not morally responsible for (some or all of) the organism's voluntary actions. Second, I...

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Bibliographic Details
Published inUtilitas Vol. 34; no. 3; pp. 317 - 334
Main Author Crummett, Dustin
Format Journal Article
LanguageEnglish
Published Cambridge, UK Cambridge University Press 01.09.2022
Subjects
Consciousness
Digestive system
Ethical dilemmas
Ethics
Organisms
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Summary:First, I introduce the concept of a “non-agential subject,” where a non-agential subject (1) exists within an organism and (2) has phenomenally conscious experiences in a morally significant way, but (3) is not morally responsible for (some or all of) the organism's voluntary actions. Second, I argue that it's a live possibility that typical adult humans contain non-agential subjects. Finally, I argue that, if there are non-agential subjects, this has important and surprising implications for a variety of ethical issues. Accordingly, ethicists should pay more attention to whether there are non-agential subjects and what their implications for ethics would be.
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ISSN:0953-8208
1741-6183
DOI:10.1017/S0953820822000115