Corporate Governance And Voluntary Disclosure In France

This paper investigates the effect of corporate governance practices on the extent of voluntary disclosure in France. Using a panel of 206 non-financial French listed firms during the period 2006-2009, we find evidence that voluntary disclosure in annual reports increases with managerial ownership,...

Full description

Saved in:
Bibliographic Details
Published inJournal of applied business research Vol. 29; no. 2; pp. 561 - 577
Main Authors Barros, Carlos P, Boubaker, Sabri, Hamrouni, Amal
Format Journal Article
LanguageEnglish
Published Laramie The Clute Institute 01.03.2013
Clute Institute
Subjects
Annual reports
Audit committees
Audit quality
Auditing
Board of directors
Boards of directors
Business management
Chief executive officers
Corporate governance
Cross-sectional studies
Disclosure
Family owned businesses
France
General Finance
Meetings
Ownership
Panel data
Quantitative Finance
Securities markets
Stock exchanges
Stockholders
Studies
Transparency
Western Europe
France
Common Correlated Effects Estimators
Voluntary Disclosure
Corporate Governance
Board of Directors
Online AccessGet full text

Cover

More Information
Summary:This paper investigates the effect of corporate governance practices on the extent of voluntary disclosure in France. Using a panel of 206 non-financial French listed firms during the period 2006-2009, we find evidence that voluntary disclosure in annual reports increases with managerial ownership, board and audit committee independence, board meeting frequency, and external audit quality. We also find that frequency of audit committee meetings and diligence of board and auditing are associated with decreased disclosure. Additional findings show that larger, more profitable, and less indebted firms have greater voluntary disclosure. [PUBLICATION ABSTRACT]
Bibliography:ObjectType-Article-2
SourceType-Scholarly Journals-1
ObjectType-Feature-1
content type line 23
ISSN:0892-7626
2157-8834
DOI:10.19030/jabr.v29i2.7657