Three-sided stable matching problem with two of them as cooperative partners

In this paper, three-sided stable matching problem is discussed, in which two sets, V 1 and V 2 are cooperative partners, and the agent of the other set U has a strict preference to the agents of set V 1 and set V 2 respectively. On the other side, the agents of set V 1 and set V 2 have a strict pre...

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Bibliographic Details
Published inJournal of combinatorial optimization Vol. 37; no. 1; pp. 286 - 292
Main Authors Zhong, Liwei, Bai, Yanqin
Format Journal Article
LanguageEnglish
Published New York Springer US 01.01.2019
Springer Nature B.V
Subjects
Acquisitions & mergers
Combinatorics
Convex and Discrete Geometry
Matching
Mathematical Modeling and Industrial Mathematics
Mathematics
Mathematics and Statistics
Operations Research/Decision Theory
Optimization
Theory of Computation
Three-sided matching
Stable matching
Algorithm
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Summary:In this paper, three-sided stable matching problem is discussed, in which two sets, V 1 and V 2 are cooperative partners, and the agent of the other set U has a strict preference to the agents of set V 1 and set V 2 respectively. On the other side, the agents of set V 1 and set V 2 have a strict preference to the agent of set U . About this three-sided matching problem, this paper gives the definition of stable matching, proves that the problem must have a stable matching, and gives an algorithm that can obtain a stable matching.
ISSN:1382-6905
1573-2886
DOI:10.1007/s10878-017-0224-z