The Impossibility of Mere Animal Knowledge for Reflective Subjects

In this paper we give reasons to think that reflective epistemic subjects cannot possess mere animal knowledge. To do so we bring together literature on defeat and higher-order evidence with literature on the distinction between animal knowledge and reflective knowledge. We then defend our argument...

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Published inErkenntnis Vol. 85; no. 4; pp. 829 - 840
Main Authors Goldberg, Sanford, Matheson, Jonathan
Format Journal Article
LanguageEnglish
Published Dordrecht Springer Netherlands 01.08.2020
Springer Nature B.V
Subjects
Animal cognition
Education
Epistemology
Ethics
Knowledge
Logic
Ontology
Original Research
Philosophy
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Summary:In this paper we give reasons to think that reflective epistemic subjects cannot possess mere animal knowledge. To do so we bring together literature on defeat and higher-order evidence with literature on the distinction between animal knowledge and reflective knowledge. We then defend our argument from a series of possible objections.
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ISSN:0165-0106
1572-8420
DOI:10.1007/s10670-018-0052-2