Sharpening the relationship between cognitive complexity and moral choice

Kant-based tradition suggests that complex moral reasoning improves moral choices, whereas intuitionists consider complex reasoning as an indicator of a desire to rationalize the immoral. The findings of this study support intuitionists, with one exception. In two studies conducted with a total of 1...

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Published inCurrent psychology (New Brunswick, N.J.) Vol. 44; no. 13; pp. 12974 - 12994
Main Authors Çağlar, Mustafa Emre, Lufityanto, Galang
Format Journal Article
LanguageEnglish
Published New York Springer US 01.07.2025
Springer Nature B.V
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ISSN1046-1310
1936-4733
DOI10.1007/s12144-025-08095-1

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Summary:Kant-based tradition suggests that complex moral reasoning improves moral choices, whereas intuitionists consider complex reasoning as an indicator of a desire to rationalize the immoral. The findings of this study support intuitionists, with one exception. In two studies conducted with a total of 195 subjects, two cognitive systems framing moral decisions came to the forefront. One is more complex than the other in terms of having multiple perspectives. It was observed that individuals who chose any of these systems and made relatively selfish decisions justified them in a more complex way. Among these selfish subjects, those who preferred the simpler system, supported their single perspectives with multiple reasons; whereas those who preferred the complex system, assumed useful perspectives to produce justifications that suited their interests. Complex reasoning contributes to the morality of the decision when it causes the decision maker to shift from the simple system to the complex one. However, according to our observations, such a shift during the decision period is not natural to human behavior, but it can still be triggered.
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ISSN:1046-1310
1936-4733
DOI:10.1007/s12144-025-08095-1