Bargaining and the dynamics of divisional norms

Recently, philosophers have investigated the emergence and evolution of the social contract. Yet extant work is limited as it focuses on the use of simple behavioral norms in rather rigid strategic settings. Drawing on axiomatic bargaining theory, we explore the dynamics of more sophisticated norms...

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Bibliographic Details
Published inSynthese (Dordrecht) Vol. 197; no. 1; pp. 407 - 425
Main Author Bruner, Justin P.
Format Journal Article
LanguageEnglish
Published Dordrecht Springer Netherlands 2020
Springer Nature B.V
Subjects
Bargaining
Behavior
Divisions
Education
Epistemology
Game theory
Logic
Metaphysics
Norms
Philosophy
Philosophy of Language
Philosophy of Science
Social construction
Social philosophy
Theory
Utilitarianism
John Nash
David Gauthier
Utilitarianism
Axiomatic bargaining
Game theory
Bargaining theory
Social norms
Social contract theory
Evolutionary game theory
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Summary:Recently, philosophers have investigated the emergence and evolution of the social contract. Yet extant work is limited as it focuses on the use of simple behavioral norms in rather rigid strategic settings. Drawing on axiomatic bargaining theory, we explore the dynamics of more sophisticated norms capable of guiding behavior in a wide range of scenarios. Overall, our investigation suggests the utilitarian bargaining solution has a privileged status as it has certain stability properties other social arrangements lack.
ISSN:0039-7857
1573-0964
DOI:10.1007/s11229-018-1729-4